



“We Lost Everything”

The Impact of Conflict on Farmers and Food Security in Lebanon

October 2023-April 2025

Executive summary

Action Against Hunger, Insecurity Insight, and Oxfam have worked collectively to document the impact of Israeli attacks on water infrastructure and food security in Lebanon between October 2023 and April 2025. This report focuses on the impact of the escalation of conflict since October 2023 on farmers and food security in Lebanon, and complements the report [When Bombs Turn the Taps Off: The Impact of Conflict on Water Infrastructure in Lebanon](#). Based on key informant interviews across South, Nabatieh, Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel governorates; satellite imagery analysis; in-country partner contributions; and the remote monitoring of online sources, the research shows the following:

Damage to and destruction of agricultural land and food production assets:

- Israeli attacks have extensively damaged or destroyed agricultural land in southern Lebanon. The attacks were especially intense during the period of Israeli forces' ground invasion in late September 2024.
- Large-scale fires affecting agricultural land caused by the use of explosive weapons and white phosphorus munitions were frequently reported.
- Farmers repeatedly expressed concern about the contamination of their agricultural land with explosive remnants of war (ERW) and white phosphorus munitions.
- Farmers in heavily conflicted areas of southern Lebanon and Bekaa have suffered multidimensional losses, affecting land, homes, livestock, and agricultural assets.

Displacement orders:

- Israeli displacement orders issued in October 2024 prevented farmers from accessing extensive areas of agricultural land in southern Lebanon and prevented fishing activities along a coastline approximately 50 km in length. Since the orders were issued, some fishers have been detained and even killed while carrying out their activities.
- As of September 2025, approximately 82,000 people remained displaced due to ongoing Israeli occupation and armed violence.¹ This protracted displacement disproportionately impacted vulnerable communities, including women, children, people with disabilities and chronic illnesses, and the elderly.

Impact on farmers:

- Approximately 90% of interviewed farmers stated that the amount of food they produced had reduced since October 2023. Thirteen farmers reported that the amount produced had reduced by 100% during a critical harvesting period.
- Major obstacles to food production included access restrictions, the damaging or destruction of crops and assets, psychological challenges and the absence of collective feelings of safety, forced displacement, and disruptions to supply chains for agricultural inputs and labour.

- As highlighted by the [report](#) covering the large-scale damage and destruction of water infrastructure in southern Lebanon, the impact on agriculture has exacerbated a shortage of water for crop irrigation amid historically low rainfall levels.
- Many of the negative impacts on farmers from the conflict have been mutually reinforcing and interlinked.
- Damage to or the destruction of agricultural land and food production assets deeply impact the people that work on and live near the land, and depend on these assets. In some cases, people have been killed while conducting their agricultural livelihood activities.
- Three key elements farmers identified that would enable them to end the negative cycle afflicting southern Lebanon and fully resume food production were financial assistance, a complete cessation of hostilities, and the clearance of ERW-contaminated land.

Impact on food distribution and physical and economic access to food:

- A historic market selling food and other essential items in Nabatieh was destroyed by an Israeli air strike in October 2024, leading to the closure of businesses and forcing stallholders to relocate.
- Approximately two-thirds of interviewees stated that they had felt unsafe using roads or transport routes to markets at some point since October 2023. As a result, some interviewees reported limiting their visits to food markets and shops or travelling further to markets or shops in areas considered safer.
- Disruptions to supply chains prevented food shops and markets in the most heavily conflict-affected areas from restocking and led to the temporary closure of many of them in southern Lebanon, particularly during Israeli forces' full-scale ground invasion (late September-late November 2024). This created physical barriers to food access, while continued price inflation and the loss of livelihood sources undermined economic access to food.
- The majority of interviewees reported that humanitarian aid had become more important for their ability to secure access to food since October 2023, underscoring their increased vulnerability amid global humanitarian aid cuts, especially since early 2025.
- In May 2025, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) reported that approximately 1.17 million people in Lebanon experienced high levels of food insecurity,² with this figure projected to rise to 1.24 million by October 2025.³

Report objectives and approach

This report is the second of a two-part series by Action Against Hunger, Insecurity Insight and Oxfam. The first report focused on the impact of conflict escalation on water supply infrastructure in Lebanon between October 2023 and April 2025. Since access to clean water itself is key to food utilisation and crop irrigation, this second report focuses on the impact of conflict on farmers and food security in Lebanon over the same period (October 2023-April 2025).

In 2018, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 2417 (2018) explicitly recognising the links between conflict and hunger.⁴ Yet, seven years later, granular information on geographic and temporal variations in the links between conflict and food insecurity remains limited.

To help address these knowledge deficits, Insecurity Insight's **Conflict and Hunger report series** has documented the impact of armed conflict on food insecurity across a range of countries and territories. The reports analyse trends in event-based data on incidents of food-related violence such as the bombing of bakeries and markets and the detonation of explosive weapons and presence of ERW on agricultural land.⁵ In doing so, the reports provide evidence supporting humanitarian advocacy and programming to address conflict-induced food insecurity. Additionally, by identifying conflict actions requiring conflict parties to take enhanced precautionary measures to protect civilian infrastructure, including objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, the reports aim to enhance compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL).

The present report builds on Insecurity Insight's previous Conflict and Hunger reports. Partnering with Action Against Hunger and Oxfam, Insecurity Insight's open-source monitoring and desk research were complemented by semi-structured key informant interviews conducted across Lebanon's South, Nabatieh, Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel governorates in late March and the first half of April 2025 (see Map 1). In total, 78 individuals were interviewed. Interviewee profiles included farmers and agricultural workers, members of communities affected by the conflict, and individuals with specific expertise on water supply infrastructure. Conducting the interviews enabled the on-the-ground verification of open-source monitoring, more granular qualitative insights into how farmers and conflict-affected communities experienced the impact of conflict, and the identification of trends and common themes in individuals' experiences. The findings are presented in the subsequent sections of this report.

Introduction and context

Agriculture has been the primary economic activity in large rural areas across⁶ Lebanon’s Bekaa, Nabatieh and South governorates, where the agri-food sector contributed up to 80% of the GDP of these regions before the outbreak of the post-October 2023 conflict.⁷ Following Lebanon’s financial crisis that started in October 2019 and the contraction of large sectors of the economy, agriculture also gained increased importance as a livelihood source, especially among poorer non-Lebanese households. Women in rural areas, and Syrian refugee women in particular, frequently engage in agricultural work that is irregular and informal, and often face challenges linked to inadequate legal and political protections.⁸ Between 2019 and 2023, the share of non-Lebanese employed in agriculture in Lebanon rose from less than 5% to almost 19%, with the Syrian community comprising a significant portion of the sector’s workforce.⁹ During the same period, there was also a small increase in the proportion of the Lebanese population employed in this sector, which stood at 5% in 2023.¹⁰ Despite this and high levels of production of crops such as potatoes, vegetables, and fruits, Lebanon remains dependent on imports, especially for cereals and pulses.¹¹ In 2022, approximately 80% of the country’s food needs were imported.¹²

Its heavy dependence on imports has made the country’s food supply system vulnerable to shocks, as has been demonstrated since the 2019 financial crisis. The devaluation of the Lebanese pound against international currencies coupled with the dependency on imports has contributed to rapid food price inflation. Between May 2020 and January 2024, average food price inflation in Lebanon remained above 130%, and peaked at 483% in January 2022.¹³ Meanwhile, damage to Lebanon’s main grain silos during the August 2020 Beirut port explosion limited the country’s capacity to store imported grain.¹⁴

The impact of these shocks has been exacerbated by inequitable resource sharing and high production costs. Before the conflict started in October 2023, around 1% of landowners controlled a quarter of Lebanon’s agricultural land surface, and 10% controlled around two-thirds of this agricultural surface.¹⁵ High rents imposed by landowners on tenant farmers and heavy dependence on imported agricultural inputs, seeds, and equipment resulted in high food production costs.¹⁶ These costs have been furthered by the extreme price inflation in Lebanon, contributing to high food prices for consumers.

Map 1: Lebanon governorates in which key informant interviews were undertaken for the report



Map: Insecurity Insight.
Boundary lines do not reflect official recognition or endorsement by Insecurity Insight.

The combination of these factors created food insecurity pre-dating the conflict escalation in October 2023. During the period January-April 2023, 2.3 million people in Lebanon faced high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or higher). Of these, 0.4 million people faced “Emergency” levels of food insecurity (IPC Phase 4). Syrian refugees in Lebanon were disproportionately affected, with 53% of this group (0.8 million people) assessed to have been in IPC Phase 3 or higher.¹⁷ In May 2025, the IPC reported that approximately 1.17 million people in Lebanon experienced high levels of food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), around 55,000 of which were classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). As of May 2025, areas facing the highest incidence of acute food insecurity were Baalbek, Hermel, Baabda, Bent Jbeil, Marjaayoun, Nabatieh, Tyre and Akkar.¹⁸ Food insecurity is projected to rise, with 1.24 million people facing IPC Phase 3 or above by October 2025.¹⁹ The reduction of humanitarian food security assistance is also a driver of this deterioration.²⁰

As of September 2025, approximately 82,000 people remained displaced due to ongoing Israeli occupation and armed violence.²¹ Such protracted displacement disproportionately impacted vulnerable communities, including women, children, people with disabilities and chronic illnesses, and the elderly, through heightened risks of gender-based violence in shelters, child labour, limited access to medical treatment, and prologued psychological trauma.²²

Escalation of hostilities and the fragile ceasefire agreement


The escalation of hostilities since October 2023 and the Israeli military's ground invasion starting on 30 September 2024, followed by intense Israeli attacks primarily in southern Lebanon, have disproportionately affected governorates that are highly dependent on agriculture. In the first 11 months of 2024 alone, Israeli forces conducted at least 12,650 armed attacks in Lebanon.²³ Before the conflict escalated, Nabatieh was an important area for olive and fruit production, while the South governorate hosted 94% of the country's banana plantations and over 60% of citrus and avocado trees.²⁴ Additionally, since 30 September 2024, over 150 air or drone strikes have been reported in Bekaa governorate and 560 have been reported in Baalbek-Hermel governorate.²⁵ Before the conflict, around 70% of Lebanon's grapes were produced in Bekaa, while Baalbek-Hermel was a key region for cereal production.²⁶

Concerningly, the conflict has escalated in a broader environmental and political-economic context that is likely to exacerbate its impact on food security. During autumn 2024, average rainfall in Lebanon fell by 120 mm compared to the previous year, contributing to barriers to accessing water for crop irrigation.²⁷ Meanwhile, the humanitarian response was significantly affected by cuts to global humanitarian aid budgets, especially in early 2025. By February 2025, UNICEF announced that funding cuts had forced it to suspend or reduce many of its aid programmes in Lebanon, including those focusing on nutrition.²⁸ Similarly, approximately 330,000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon previously receiving cash assistance were removed from World Food Programme (WFP) aid programmes in the same month.²⁹

While this report does not focus specifically on the human casualties of the conflict, it should be noted that in some cases people have also been killed while conducting agricultural activities. For example, in October 2024, a family picking olives in Sinay, southern Lebanon, was struck by an air strike, resulting in one death and several injuries.³⁰ Given that the Israeli military’s attacks in Lebanon have reportedly killed over 4,000 people since October 2023 and the professions of casualties are inconsistently recorded, it is likely that more farmers have been killed than is currently known.³¹

Although a ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon was agreed on 27 November 2024, over 400 air or drone strikes and over 300 incidents of artillery or missile fire from Israeli forces have been reported in Lebanon since this date.³² Meanwhile, Israeli troops have remained in locations in southern Lebanon despite a February 2025 deadline for their withdrawal.³³

Map 2: The five areas in southern Lebanon remaining under Israeli occupation as of September 2025³⁴



Map: Insecurity Insight. Base map: UN OCHA

Reported damage to and destruction of agricultural land and food production assets in Lebanon, 8 October 2023-30 April 2025

In line with the overall geographic concentration of Israel’s military campaign in Lebanon, incidents of food-related violence have been most frequently recorded in the Nabatieh and South governorates, often in close proximity to the Israeli border. Due to mass displacement orders for communities in southern Lebanon, first-hand accounts of specific conflict events directly affecting farming communities and food-related infrastructure are limited. As such, damage assessments, although limited in their information on exactly how or when infrastructure was damaged, are likely to provide a greater overall account of the extent of the conflict’s impact on agricultural land and food production assets in Lebanon. As early as December 2023, Lebanon’s Ministry of Agriculture reported that due to the conflict in Lebanon since October 2023:³⁵

- 47,000 olive trees had been burned by phosphorous bombs;³⁶
- around 60 agricultural greenhouses, 250 beehives and a 600 m2 fodder warehouse had been destroyed; and
- 200,000 birds and chickens and 700 head of livestock had been killed.

Damage to and destruction of agricultural land and food production assets

Damage to and the destruction of agricultural land and food production assets deeply impact the people that work on, live near, and depend on them. Four main conflict actions were reported directly affecting farmers and their agricultural land: the striking of agricultural land with explosive weapons and white phosphorus munitions; conflict-induced crop fires on agricultural land; the bulldozing of agricultural land; and incidents damaging or destroying farmers’ private assets and livestock.

The striking of agricultural land with explosive weapons has been repeatedly reported and at particularly intense levels in southern Lebanon around the period of the Israeli forces’ ground invasion in late September 2024. A UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) report based on ACLED data states that between 23 September and 1 November 2024, “336 instances of aerial strikes or shelling are estimated to have struck cropland, of which 74 affected irrigated areas”.³⁷ This has resulted in the extensive contamination of agricultural land with ERW. For example, one farmer who farmed in Aitaroun, Nabatieh governorate, suggested that 9,000 m2 of land planted with crops, including olive trees, had been affected by some form of weapon contamination.³⁸ Another farmer from Aitaroun growing crops that included tomatoes, onions, peas and parsley reported 3,000 m2 of his agricultural land being affected by weapon contamination.³⁹

Thirteen informants interviewed for this report discussed the impact of the use of suspected white phosphorus munitions in Aitaroun, Bent Jbeil, and Khiam in Nabatieh governorate and Hawsh Barada in Baalbek-Hermel governorate.⁴⁰ The observed damage and destruction included soil contamination rendering the land unsuitable for cultivation, the presence of ERW, the destruction of agricultural equipment, and

large craters in the land. A farmer in Aitaroun explained that he was unable to farm his land or cultivate crops. Despite applying agricultural supplements and treatments to the soil, the impact of soil contamination remains pervasive and requires additional treatment.⁴¹ A farmer in Khiam also emphasised the importance of financial support for farmers to treat contaminated land and resume agricultural activities.⁴²

While the specific incidents reported by interviewees have not been independently verified, Israeli forces’ use of white phosphorous munitions is well documented, and both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have verified their use in Lebanon since October 2023, and in previous conflicts in 1982 and 2006.⁴³

Among the means by which agricultural land has been damaged or destroyed, conflict-induced crop fires were the most frequently referred to by the interviewed farmers. In total, 27 farmers stated that fires resulting from the conflict (e.g. fires igniting crops after the detonation of explosive weapons) had led to damage to or the destruction of their agricultural land. Six of these farmers farmed in Khiam and a further five were from Aitaroun. One farmer in Arnoun, Nabatieh governorate, suggested that in some cases, fires started by military attacks had spread from their intended target to affect agricultural land.⁴⁴ Farmers in Aitaroun reported that between eight and nine dunams of land (approximately 8,000-9,000 m²)⁴⁵ had been affected, with one stating that fires occurred in August 2024.⁴⁶ Other farmers who reported being affected by conflict-induced crop fires farmed in locations that included Bent Jbeil, Baalbek, Hosh Barda and Saaideh.

Satellite images (see Figure 2) show large areas of agricultural land that appear to have been burned during similar periods to those referenced by key informants and media reports. In some of these locations, NASA FIRMS⁴⁷ also detected fires in the period between which the satellite images appear to show the emergence of burn marks.⁴⁸ The impact of fires on agricultural land is exacerbated by continued armed attacks, which increase access and security challenges for workers attempting to extinguish fires. These challenges are also compounded by environmental factors, such as low levels of rainfall in the affected areas.

In addition to conflict-induced crop fires, multiple farmers reported that Israeli forces had bulldozed their agricultural land, a phenomenon that Insecurity Insight had previously documented in Gaza.⁴⁹ Three farmers in Aitaroun, a village in Nabatieh governorate around 2.5 km from the Israeli border, stated that their agricultural land had been bulldozed. The farmers grew crops such as wheat, barley, lentils, chickpeas and olives. One of these farmers stated that 1.5 dunams of his land was bulldozed in November 2024, representing a significant portion of the total 4 dunams which he owned and 10 which he rented.⁵⁰ Five farmers in Khiam, which is also in Nabatieh and around 5 km from the Israeli border, stated that Israeli forces had bulldozed their agricultural land, which had affected crops that included olives and grape trees.⁵¹ Additionally, in late December 2024, a sapling propagation project supported by the WFP in Wadi Houjeir was reportedly razed by bulldozers.⁵²

Testimonies from farmers in Khiam indicate the extent of the losses experienced by some communities. One farmer from Khiam stated his land had been struck by explosive weapons that destroyed his wheat crops, killed 15 of his cows and damaged his truck following the escalation of conflict in September 2024. Meanwhile, Israeli forces had been positioned close to his land, preventing him from carrying out his agricultural activities.⁵³ Similarly, another farmer from Khiam stated that their agricultural land was damaged, a warehouse storing wheat was destroyed by shelling, a tractor and an irrigation network and its pumps were damaged, and olive trees were burned after the September 2024 escalation.⁵⁴ One farmer farming in Khiam also stated that around 50 of their chickens were killed; bee hives, wheat stock and greenhouses were damaged; and lemon trees were burned.⁵⁵ Partly as a result of this, all food production on the farm had stopped.


Consistent with the statements of farmers from Khiam, the images in Figure 3 show one agricultural structure used for storing livestock feed in Khiam that was destroyed following the conflict escalation, irrigation pipes that have been uprooted and damaged, agricultural land that has been degraded, and trees that have been uprooted.

Figure 1: Damaged greenhouse in Bent Jbeil, Nabatieh governorate



Source: © Action Against Hunger

Figure 2: Satellite images appearing to show the burning of agricultural land in Rmaych, Bent Jbeil, June 2024



Source: © NASA FIRMS

Figure 3: Images showing the destruction of a livestock feed storage structure, the degradation of agricultural land, the uprooting and damaging of trees, and the damaging of irrigation pipelines in Khiam, Nabatieh governorate



Source: © Action Against Hunger

White phosphorus: its effects and legality

White phosphorus is a toxic and highly flammable chemical substance that ignites instantly on contact with oxygen.⁵⁶ It can be used as a component in a variety of munitions and serves four distinct purposes for militaries: illumination, signalling, screening, and incendiary.⁵⁷ However, white phosphorus can be harmful to humans, causing thermal and chemical burns, severe injury to internal organs, and respiratory disorders, and can also damage agricultural land and crops.⁵⁸ An academic paper provides an overview of the potential destructive impacts of white phosphorus munitions:

“When a white phosphorus bomb is detonated, it releases phosphorus pentoxide (P₄O₁₀) and other phosphorus oxides, which can react with moisture in the air to form phosphoric acid (H₃PO₄). Phosphoric acid is corrosive and can lead to soil acidification. This can have detrimental effects on soil fertility and plant growth. The acidification of soil can alter its pH, making it less suitable for many crops and disrupting nutrient availability. Additionally, the release of phosphorus compounds into the environment can contribute to water pollution if not properly contained. Furthermore, white phosphorus is highly flammable, and its combustion can result in the production of toxic by-products, including phosphorus pentoxide and phosphoric acid. These by-products can pose risks to both the environment and human health.”⁵⁹

White phosphorus munitions used in armed conflict are considered to be incendiary weapons that are not explicitly prohibited under IHL. However, customary IHL obliges conflict parties to take “all feasible precautions to avoid the harm to civilians caused by those weapons”.⁶⁰ Protocol III of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons also prohibits the use of air-delivered incendiary weapons in “concentrations of civilians”.⁶¹ However, as Human Rights Watch has highlighted, the protocol is characterised by loopholes. For example, its “definition of incendiary weapons covers weapons that are ‘primarily designed’ to set fires and burn people and thus arguably excludes multipurpose munitions, such as those containing white phosphorus if they are being used as smokescreens, even if they cause the same incendiary effects”.⁶²

Irrespective of the legal status of white phosphorus, the damage inflicted by its use is often significant and has long-term negative consequences for affected agricultural land and populations. Overall, effective and timely containment and mitigation measures could reduce the spread of toxic residues and further contamination, reducing their negative impact. Mitigation strategies can include the containment of affected areas, the use of engineering controls such as barriers or trenches, and the use of remediation techniques using certain plant species and micro-organisms that absorb and break down phosphorus in soil.⁶³ However, the implementation of such measures has been impeded for many of the interview participants and affected communities in Lebanon, who have been forcibly displaced and prevented from accessing their agricultural land by Israeli military forces.


The impact of conflict on water access among farming communities in Lebanon

The Action Against Hunger, Insecurity Insight, and Oxfam joint report [When Bombs Turn the Taps Off](#) demonstrates the long-term negative and reverberating impacts of attacks that damage or destroy water infrastructure in Lebanon. It shows that between October 2023 and November 2024, water infrastructure in Lebanon was repeatedly struck, damaged and rendered inoperable as a result of Israeli attacks that primarily involved the use of air-launched explosive weapons. Farmers were among the communities affected. More than 82% of farmers interviewed for the present report stated that they had experienced difficulties accessing sufficient water to irrigate crops or provide drinking water for livestock since October 2023.⁶⁴ The interviewed farmers farmed in areas that included Khiam, Aitaroun, Bodai, Saaideh and Bent Jbeil. Some farmers also referred to low rainfall as exacerbating the effects of the disruption of supplies of running water.

Displacement orders and access restrictions affecting extensive areas of agricultural land and fishing communities

Although insecurity had created obstacles for farmers accessing land in southern Lebanon since October 2023, the situation deteriorated significantly after Israel’s ground invasion at the end of September 2024. Between 1 and 7 October 2024, the Israeli military issued a series of displacement orders that led to the forced displacement of residents of around 118 villages and towns in southern Lebanon.⁶⁵ As shown in Map 3, the orders affected substantial areas of Nabatieh and South governorates – regions with economies heavily dependent on agriculture. The issuing of these orders also coincided with the olive harvest period. As such, the orders effectively required farmers and agricultural communities to abandon their crops and livelihoods.

Israeli also issued orders specifically affecting southern Lebanese fishing communities. On 7 October 2024, the Israeli military ordered “anyone using boats for fishing” southward of the Awali River (shown in Map 3) to refrain from these activities until further notice.⁶⁶ As a result, the majority of the 700 fishers working on around 270 boats from the port of Tyre reportedly stopped fishing in the period between Israeli forces’ ground invasion and the ceasefire agreement in late November 2024.⁶⁷ Similar disruptions were reported in Sidon and Naqoura.⁶⁸ As of late June 2025, the warning against fishing had not been officially lifted, despite the declared ceasefire. In the same month, Israeli forces reportedly issued leaflets to fishers at the ports of Tyre and Naqoura warning of “reprisals if they approached the Israeli maritime borders”.⁶⁹



These actions by Israeli forces demonstrate their willingness to use force against Lebanese fishers. In early February 2025, a fisher working off the coast of Naqoura was captured by Israeli forces while fishing and has reportedly since been detained in Israel.⁷⁰ Two fishers were also killed by an air strike on a beach in Tyre in November 2024, and a bomb was reportedly dropped in proximity to a fishing boat off the coast of Naqoura in June 2025.⁷¹

The mutually reinforcing negative impacts of the conflict on farming livelihoods

Based on the interviews conducted with farmers, several common impacts of the conflict in southern Lebanon on farming communities were identified. As illustrated in Figure 4 and the following paragraphs, these negative impacts have often been mutually reinforcing and interlinked. Thus, one negative impact triggers another, creating a vicious cycle that is difficult for farmers to break. These repercussions often last for months or years beyond the initial conflict that caused them.

The displacement orders for large areas of southern Lebanon coupled with the high intensity of Israeli attacks directly prevented farmers from accessing their agricultural land and crops. Over 40% of the interviewed farmers had themselves been internally displaced, highlighting the difficulties they are likely to have experienced accessing their agricultural land.⁷² Even if farmers were not displaced, broader concerns about security often limited their ability to access their land. Almost 70% of interviewed farmers stated that they had been unable to access their agricultural land at some point since October 2023, and around 93% of farmers felt unsafe accessing land to plant or harvest crops or graze livestock during the same period.⁷³ Farmers affected in this way farmed in locations that included Aitaroun, Bent Jbeil, Khiam, Baalbek, Saaideh and Bodai.

As a result of the restrictions on accessing agricultural land, the harvesting and planting of crops experienced large-scale disruptions. Approximately 76% of interviewed farmers said that they had not been able to plant and harvest crops as normal since October 2023.⁷⁴ The fact that the escalation of hostilities in October in both 2023 and 2024 coincided with the olive and carob harvests is likely to have contributed to this.

“[B]efore the war I used to rent land along with my own, and I planted on it. But now, I’m waiting to see the security and economic situation in the country.”

Unemployed farmer, Baalbek, Baalbek-Hermel governorate, April 2025

The amount of food farmers produced in heavily conflict-affected areas reduced dramatically as a result of these developments. Around 90% of interviewed farmers said that the overall amount of food they had produced had reduced since October 2023.⁷⁵ The food production of several farmers in Khiam, Bodai, Saaideh, Baalbek and Aitaroun had completely stopped, depriving them of their main income source.⁷⁶ Farmers in Baalbek suggested that the greatest disruption to food production had occurred after Israel’s ground invasion in late September 2024. The affected farmers grew a diversity of crops, including olives, wheat, potatoes, cucumbers, tomatoes, and other fruits and vegetables intended for sale both directly to individuals, local markets, and traders, as well as, in some cases, being traded more widely across Lebanon.

The inability to harvest crops exacerbated challenges created by the direct damaging or destruction of crops due to the conflict. In November 2024, the FAO reported that since October 2023, 12,200 hectares of cropland - around 22% of agricultural land in South and Nabatieh governorates - had either been “burned or could not be harvested due to the hostilities”.⁷⁷


Changes in demand for produce, disruptions to supplies of agricultural inputs and financial barriers to food production

Although the inability to access agricultural land and conflict-related damage to or the destruction of land and crops was fundamental in undermining food production, the interviews conducted for this report also highlighted an array of additional conflict-related factors that affected food production. This is reflected in the fact that among the minority of farmers who stated that they had been able to plant or harvest crops as usual since October 2023, the majority nonetheless reported reductions in the amount of food they produced. Some of them reported reduced demand for their produce owing to the forced displacement of customers and these customers having less money to spend on food. These factors may partly explain why these farmers produced less food even if they could access their land.

“Agricultural inputs became more difficult to obtain because of the conflict, especially after September 2024. [R]oads became unsafe, many suppliers stopped working, and prices have increased.”

Unemployed farmer, Baalbek, Baalbek-Hermel governorate, April 2025

Figure 4: The mutually reinforcing and interlinked negative impacts of conflict on farming communities in Lebanon



Furthermore, approximately 73% of interviewed farmers stated that agricultural inputs such as seeds and fuel needed for powering equipment had become more difficult to obtain since October 2023.⁷⁸ Financial difficulties were the most commonly cited reason for this. Additionally, one farmer who grew potatoes in Baalbek and stopped farming after the conflict escalation in late September 2024 stated that companies in Bekaa had shut down during this period. As a result, it was necessary to travel to Beirut - approximately 90 km by road from Bekaa - to obtain materials. However, roads were affected by insecurity and the threat of Israeli air strikes, creating difficulties in accessing agricultural inputs.⁷⁹

“I no longer have money to farm, and the country is not safe. We need to end the war and see how we can start again.”

Unemployed farmer, Buday and Saaideh, Baalbek-Hermel governorate, April 2025

Combined, the reduction in productivity and the damaging or destruction of their assets have resulted in significant financial losses for many Lebanese agricultural communities. During the 2024 harvest period, Lebanon’s olive harvest across the country as a whole experienced a US\$58 million loss in revenues.⁸⁰ Several farmers highlighted that they could no longer afford to employ labourers on their farms due to financial losses.⁸¹

The negative psychological impacts of war: the loss of collective feelings of safety and its effect on food production

Fear and mental health challenges emerged as both a consequence of the conflict and a barrier to work for agricultural workers and affected communities. “The war affected the spirit before the land”, stated the owner of a small agricultural business.⁸² Two farmers noted that people had taken “anxiety medication” to cope with the mental health issues they suffered due to the conflict.⁸³ This again highlights that obstacles to food production extend beyond physical damage and limited financial resources, and that collective feelings of safety and security are also key.

For many interviewees, feelings of being unsafe derived from perceptions of indiscriminate and unpredictable attacks being made across the country. For example, a small-business owner⁸⁴ stated: “It was dangerous since you never knew when and where the hit will be”; a farmer⁸⁵ described air strikes on nearby places as “sudden”; and another farmer stated they “left the area during the 66 days of war [late September-late November 2024], for it was too dangerous to stay due to random and chaotic air strikes”.⁸⁶ An agricultural business owner added that “the war hit centres, shops, and homes. They bombed every place, leaving nothing behind, only to target it again”.⁸⁷

Pre-war high levels of production required the consistent contribution of a skilled workforce. Although several farmers expressed high levels of tolerance of risk in an inherently insecure context, and even indifference driven by the determination to return to work, farming is far from an individual enterprise. The owner of a large agricultural business explained that workers were not willing to risk their lives to work in dangerous areas.⁸⁸ A small-business owner of a chicken farm also reported a reduction in the quality of labour when workers did arrive to work, citing shorter working hours and employees choosing to cut their working hours short in an unpredictable manner.⁸⁹

These findings support one of the key themes that farmers highlighted in the interviews: the complete cessation of hostilities and respect for the ceasefire are essential for restoring feelings of safety and fully resuming agricultural activities.


Coping mechanisms and the importance of assistance for rehabilitation

Farmers highlighted that they had adopted several coping mechanisms in response to the challenges created by the conflict. These included reducing the use of fertilisers due to price increases and using animal manure instead.⁹⁰ Two farmers in Bent Jbeil also stated that in future they would rely on rain-fed rather than irrigated crops due to insufficient water resources.⁹¹

In addition to the full cessation of hostilities and the clearance of ERW from agricultural land, multiple farmers highlighted the importance of the provision of financial assistance to enable them to properly resume farming activities in the long term. Since October 2023, over 40% of interviewed farmers had received humanitarian aid, including food parcels and cash assistance.⁹² Given the vulnerable situation of many of these individuals despite the previous aid they had received, this underscores the importance of the provision of enhanced support to rehabilitate resilient Lebanese farming communities.

“If I receive financial support, I will return to farming; if not, I definitely won't be able to farm.”

Unemployed farmer, Saaideh, Baalbek-Hermel governorate, April 2025



Markets and food distribution during the conflict escalation

Arguably the most notable conflict incident directly affecting food distribution occurred around two weeks after Israel’s ground invasion of Lebanon, when an Israeli air strike struck the old souq in Nabatieh city on 12 October 2024, causing the large-scale destruction of market stalls.⁹³ The weekly market, which sold food and other essential commodities, had been restored only two years previously, and was a meeting point for farmers and producers from southern Lebanon and merchants from Tyre, Sidon, Jezzine and other localities in southern Lebanon.⁹⁴ After the attack, some shops that were directly damaged or destroyed were reported to have closed permanently, while others changed location either to nearby or more distant locations, creating financial costs for market traders.⁹⁵ At the end of November 2024, a representative from the Nabatieh Emergency Rescue Service Association stated that they had not been able to “find anything to eat” in the area for the previous three days: restaurants “are gone, banks are gone, food stores are all gone”.⁹⁶

“[S]ince the conflict escalated, there have been feelings of fear and insecurity when using roads or transport routes to markets. The general atmosphere is tense, and people are afraid to go out”

Tuk-tuk driver, Baalbek, Baalbek-Hermel governorate, April 2025

The incident in Nabatieh was not the first time that food markets in Lebanon had been directly affected by the escalation of hostilities. When thousands of pagers exploded simultaneously in mid-September 2024 during attacks authorised by the Israeli government, at least one of these explosions was reported at a busy supermarket, injuring one person.⁹⁷

“I felt unsafe due to the conflict [...]. I reduced my trips to buy food, and only went out when absolutely necessary to avoid putting myself at risk.”

Unemployed resident, Saaideh, Baalbek-Hermel governorate, April 2025

Restoring markets is a long-term process. By September 2025, some shops and stalls in the surrounding area of the old souq in Nabatieh had reopened following the substantial damage in the area from an Israeli air strike in November 2024. On the initiative of local businesses, partial reconstruction had begun. However, it is estimated that it will take at least two years to rebuild the souq.⁹⁸⁹⁹

“[S]uppliers of goods from other parts of the country felt unsafe to access these markets all of the time.”

Municipal worker, April 2025

Violence at markets and concerns about generalised insecurity and indiscriminate bombing resulted in people feeling unsafe about travelling to markets, and in some cases limiting the number of journeys to these locations. Approximately two-thirds of interviewees stated that they had felt unsafe using roads or other transport routes to markets at some point since October 2023.¹⁰⁰ Individuals from locations including Nabatieh, Saaideh, Baalbek and Arnoun were among those who felt unsafe travelling to markets. They highlighted concerns about air strikes on roads and a general atmosphere of fear. Five interviewees referred specifically to the bombing of Nabatieh market, indicating the event’s significance in reducing collective feelings of safety in civilian areas.

Even if individuals felt safe travelling to food markets, many markets closed, especially during the period between late September 2024 and late November 2024 in areas that were most heavily impacted by the conflict. Some interviewees stated that some shops opened for short periods of time to enable access to some food, but over 80% stated that shops had not remained open as normal during the period of conflict escalation.¹⁰¹ In locations such as Nabatieh, shops reportedly remained closed throughout the period between late September 2024 and late November 2024.¹⁰² Concerns about security among food suppliers who decided not to travel to areas heavily affected by the conflict were cited as one reason for the closure of food shops, which were unable to restock their shelves.

“The shops in Baalbek were closed during the war in 2024, and this definitely led to difficulties in accessing basic food items.”

Unemployed resident, Baalbek, Baalbek-Hermel governorate, April 2025

Economic and physical barriers to food access, and the role of humanitarian aid

Ultimately, the extensive damaging and destruction of vital infrastructure in Lebanon and the disruption of food production and distribution translated into increased economic and physical barriers to accessing food. Around 89% of respondents said that the conflict since October 2023 had affected their households’ ability to meet their food needs.¹⁰³ Two conflict-related dynamics directly led to this situation.

Firstly, the closure of shops increased physical barriers to food access. The majority of interviewees indicated that purchasing food from local markets or shops was the main source of their food before the conflict escalated. After the closure of shops and markets and the difficulties faced by traders in restocking, individuals in Baalbek and Nabatieh reported finding it difficult to access essential food supplies.¹⁰⁴ These findings are consistent with those of the IPC, which found that food supply chains worsened in early November 2024, especially in Nabatieh and South governorates and the southern suburbs of Beirut.¹⁰⁵ To maintain their access to food following the Israeli forces’ ground invasion of southern Lebanon in late September 2024, some interviewees, including in Arnoun, Nabatieh governorate, reported travelling longer distances to buy food in areas considered to be safer.¹⁰⁶

“[A]fter September 2024, everything changed. Prices increased a lot, and there was hoarding of some basic food items.”

Unemployed farmer, Saaideh, Baalbek-Hermel governorate, April 2025

Secondly, food became less affordable for many people due to the conflict. As of late October 2024, the escalation of conflict in Lebanon over the preceding year was estimated to have led to job losses for 166,000 individuals, which was equivalent to US\$168 million in annual income losses.¹⁰⁷ Food price inflation in Lebanon has also remained high: between October and December 2023, inflation remained above 200%. Although the food price inflation rate subsequently decreased, it exceeded 20% in all except one month between January 2024 and April 2025.¹⁰⁸ One farmer highlighted increases in prices of olives and carobs due to the reduced production and availability of these food items following the escalation of conflict.¹⁰⁹

“After the war, humanitarian aid became more important, especially since many people lost their homes and jobs and became in need of assistance.”

Potato and onion farmer, Saaideh, Baalbek-Hermel governorate, April 2025

In this context of increased physical and economic barriers to food access, the majority of interviewees stated that since October 2023, humanitarian aid had become more important for ensuring they obtained sufficient food.¹¹⁰ Individuals most frequently referred to a lack of income and financial resources as the reason for their increased dependence on aid to obtain food. This further underscores that the significant cuts in global humanitarian aid budgets, especially since early 2025, have affected communities at a time of heightened vulnerability.

Conclusions

The first report in this series demonstrated the devastating long-term and reverberating impacts of repeated Israeli attacks damaging and destroying water infrastructure in southern Lebanon and Bekaa. This report had already highlighted the impact of disruptions to irrigation water supplies, exacerbated by the destruction of essential water infrastructure. The present report has revealed the much wider impacts of the conflict on farming communities and food security in Lebanon.

The Israeli military's sustained and high-intensity attacks in southern Lebanon have caused large-scale damage to and degradation of agricultural land, and have destroyed the essential infrastructure and private assets of large numbers of farmers. Extensive displacement orders, especially in southern Lebanon starting in October 2024, forced farmers from their land and prevented fishing activities. Even if farmers were able to access their land, concerns about indiscriminate bombing, difficulties in obtaining essential agricultural inputs and human resources, and financial barriers have led to considerable reductions in food production. The negative impacts on farmers are mutually reinforcing, interlinked and reverberating, creating a negative cycle that is difficult to break out of.

Meanwhile, large-scale insecurity, particularly in southern Lebanon following Israeli forces' full-scale invasion in late September 2024, disrupted food supply chains and led to the closure of food markets and shops, creating physical barriers to food access. Fears about indiscriminate bombing led to people limiting their journeys to food markets and shops, while continued price rises and large-scale job losses created economic barriers to food access. As a result, humanitarian aid became more important among conflict-affected populations.

Despite the ceasefire, Israeli attacks continued and the Israeli armed forces maintained their presence on Lebanese territory, especially in the south of the country, limiting displaced residents' ability to return to their homes. Even if they do return after being displaced, their inability to easily resume their livelihood activities makes resuming normal life virtually impossible for many people. The persistent failure to end the decades-long conflict in the region has created a culture of impunity. Only through a full and permanent cessation of hostilities and the full withdrawal of Israeli forces can farming and food production be rehabilitated among Lebanese communities, civilians feel safe in accessing food, and a semblance of normalcy be provided to the lives of communities that have lost so much.

Recommendations

To UN member states and advocates for permanently ending hostilities and impunity and upholding IHL:

- Call on all parties to the conflict to strictly comply with the ceasefire agreement, fully adhere to IHL, and ensure the protection of civilians, health workers, and essential infrastructure. Since the 26 January 2025 ceasefire extension, over 460 Israeli-launched air or drone strikes and over 200 Israeli-launched artillery and missile strikes have been reported in Lebanon.¹¹¹
- Call on all parties to the conflict to refrain from actions that would exacerbate the suffering of innocent civilians and impede humanitarian access for the delivery of assistance to the most vulnerable.
- Call on all parties to the conflict to actively uphold and reaffirm UNSCR 2417, with particular emphasis on operative paragraph 1, which demands that parties to armed conflict comply fully with IHL, including the obligation to protect civilian objects such as food and water supply systems, agricultural land, markets, and medical facilities.
- Continue to publicly call for the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory as a crucial component of the ceasefire agreement.
- Support the establishment of independent, impartial, and transparent investigations into all allegations of IHL violations consistent with due process and the general principles of law.
- Urge third state parties to utilise all possible means to consistently uphold IHL. This includes leveraging diplomatic channels and political influence to foster compliance with IHL, particularly when these states are confronted with credible reports of significant IHL violations, with the ultimate aim of preventing and halting such violations.
- In public and private advocacy with key stakeholders, ensure that Lebanon does not become a forgotten humanitarian crisis, by highlighting the recent conflict's effects on the civilian population and the severe levels of damage to food-related infrastructure and impact on farming communities.
- Push for enhanced humanitarian and development material support and funding to address Lebanon's heightened humanitarian needs and reconstruction plans.
- Continue to call for unrestricted access to humanitarian aid for those in need.
- Call on Israeli forces to end the use of white phosphorus in populated areas and on or in proximity to agricultural land.
- Encourage all parties to the conflict to endorse and become signatories to the EWIPA Political Declaration and to uphold and implement its commitments.

To humanitarian programmers and donors:

- Assess opportunities to support the rehabilitation of conflict-affected farming communities in Lebanon, including through the provision of cash assistance.
- Continue to support detailed assessments of the contamination of agricultural land with ERW and the implementation of programmes to clear this land and enable it to be used for food production.
- Prioritise funding for sustainable agriculture, including land clearance and rehabilitation, the restoration of productive assets, and support for smallholder farmers to restart production while shifting towards more sustainable approaches such as agroecology.
- Support the repair and upgrading of irrigation networks, storage facilities, and local food-processing units to restore value chains, strengthen market access, and promote resilient livelihoods, particularly for displaced and refugee populations.

To EWIPA Political Declaration signatories:

- Uphold and implement commitments under the EWIPA Political Declaration to strengthen the protection of civilian objects, including food-related infrastructure, during and after armed conflict that involves the use of explosive weapons.
- Continue to promote and disseminate the declaration among all relevant stakeholders and underscore the serious and long-term reverberating effects of the use of explosive weapons against or in close proximity to food-related infrastructure.

Methodology

The event-based data in this report on conflict incidents directly affecting food-related infrastructure in Lebanon is based on open-source news monitoring, data extracted from the [Armed Conflict Location & Event Database](#) and [Insecurity Insight's Security in Numbers Database](#), and partner contributions. It covers the period from 8 October 2023 to 30 April 2025. Sources were cross-checked to identify duplicate incidents, but these incidents have not been independently verified. The event-based data, including information on the dates and locations of specific incidents in which food-related infrastructure was directly affected by conflict violence, is limited by significant reporting barriers. Displacement orders for communities in southern Lebanon mean that only a limited number of people are likely to have witnessed and reported on the specific details of conflict incidents and the civilian infrastructure directly affected during them.

Additionally, a further 69 semi-structured key informant interviews were conducted that focused on understanding the impact of the conflict's escalation on farmers, food security and affected communities. A further 33 semi-structured key informant interviews were conducted specifically focusing on the impact of the conflict on water supply infrastructure in Lebanon. These key informant interviews were conducted between March and April 2025 and focused on Lebanon's South, Nabatieh, Bekaa, and Baalbek-Hermel governorates. In total, 78 individuals were interviewed. Interviewee profiles included farmers and agricultural workers, members of affected communities, local mayors and authority officials, and individuals with specific expertise on Lebanon's water supply infrastructure. The key informant interviews were limited by the unique experiences of individual key informants and their own biases and perceptions, which may have been influenced by potential conflict-induced trauma.

IHL and the damaging and destruction of food-related infrastructure in Lebanon

Under IHL (i.e. the law applicable in armed conflict), parties to a conflict are obliged to protect civilian infrastructure such as agricultural land and crops, water supply infrastructure, and food markets. Several key principles underpin these rules.

Principle of distinction

Parties to a conflict must always distinguish between lawful military targets and civilians and civilian objects.¹¹² Deliberately targeting civilians and civilian objects is prohibited and amounts to a war crime.¹¹³ Water supply infrastructure, food markets, and agricultural land and crops are protected as civilian objects under IHL and must not be attacked. This infrastructure also benefits from a presumption of civilian status. As such, in situations where there is doubt regarding whether such an object constitutes a legitimate military target, it must be treated as civilian, and conflict parties must protect the object from attack.¹¹⁴

Civilian objects may temporarily lose their protection from attacks if and for such limited time as they are used for military purposes. Yet even in this event, attacks against civilian objects are only permissible if they comply with the IHL principles of proportionality and precautions (see below).

In addition to the general protection afforded to all civilian objects during armed conflict, foodstuffs, agricultural areas, livestock, crops, drinking water installations, water supplies, and irrigation works benefit from special protection under IHL. This is because they are classified as “objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population” and, as such, they must never be attacked, destroyed, removed, or rendered unusable.¹¹⁵ The types of objects covered by this rule could also include types of energy infrastructure (e.g. solar panels for irrigation) on which objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population depend. Attacks against these objects are only permitted in narrowly defined exceptions: when the objects are directly supporting military action or are used exclusively to sustain enemy armed forces.¹¹⁶ It can reasonably be assumed that the food-related objects discussed in this report are unlikely to be used solely for the benefit of armed forces. However, even if these exceptional cases applied, IHL explicitly prohibits any action against these objects which “may be expected to leave the civilian population with such inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or force its movement”.¹¹⁷

Principle of proportionality

The principle of proportionality strictly prohibits launching an attack that may be expected to cause civilian harm (e.g. incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof) that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.¹¹⁸ This assessment must be conducted for each specific attack rather than the broader military campaign. Knowingly launching an attack that will cause clearly excessive civilian harm constitutes a war crime.¹¹⁹

Furthermore, it is increasingly accepted that the reverberating effects of attacks should be included on the “expected civilian harm” side of the proportionality assessment.¹²⁰ Reverberating effects may include the foreseeable consequence that civilians are no longer able to produce sufficient food to maintain their livelihoods. Once essential civilian infrastructure has been damaged, the civilian harm resulting from further destruction may become more foreseeable due to the lack of alternatives.

External assessments of compliance with the principle of proportionality are limited because they are made after the fact and lack access to the classified intelligence available to military decision-makers. However, consistently targeting food-related objects and other related infrastructure and thus leaving affected populations without the means to produce food and continue their livelihood activities is unlikely to meet the proportionality test owing to the foreseeable and excessive harm to the civilian population.

Principle of precautions

Even when a military target is lawful and the anticipated civilian harm is deemed proportionate, attacking conflict parties are still required to take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimise harm to civilians and damage to civilian infrastructure, including food-related objects.¹²¹ “Feasible” refers to what is practically achievable, based on the conditions at the time, and requires balancing humanitarian concerns and military imperatives. This includes:

- **Verifying targets:** Based on the best available intelligence, parties to a conflict must do everything possible to confirm that a target is a legitimate military objective. Civilian objects, including water supply infrastructure, must be presumed civilian in cases of doubt.¹²²

- **Minimising harm:** Attacks must be planned and carried out to reduce risks to civilians. This includes taking into account the weapons used and the timing of attacks, and choosing locations for attacks that limit harm to civilians or civilian objects. The precision of the weapons that will be used and the extent of the blast caused by their detonation should be considered so as to minimise harm to civilian objects while pursuing legitimate military targets. As documented in this report, the Israeli military’s extensive use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in close proximity to civilian objects, including water supply infrastructure, raises concerns about compliance with the principle of precautions.¹²³
- **Cancelling attacks:** If it becomes clear that a target is not lawful or the expected civilian harm would be excessive, the attack must be halted or suspended.

Moreover, the parties must take all feasible precautions to protect civilians and civilian objects, including food-related objects, under their control against the effects of attacks.¹²⁴ For instance, this means not targeting military objectives in the vicinity of food-related objects.¹²⁵

Importantly, even if one side fails to fulfil its obligation to take precautions against the effects of its attacks, this does not absolve the other party of its responsibilities to adhere to the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions, which remain applicable in all circumstances.¹²⁶ The Israeli military has claimed that Hezbollah is hiding both personnel and weapons among civilians and civilian objects. This has not been substantiated, and in any case, conduct of this kind does not relieve Israel of its obligation to comply with the duty to take all feasible precautions and satisfy the other binding obligations of distinction and proportionality.

Footnotes

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72 Seventeen of 41 interviewed farmers described themselves as internally displaced.

73 Twenty-seven of 39 interviewed farmers responded “Yes” to the following question: “Have you been unable to access the agricultural land that you and your colleagues work at any time since October 2023?” Five of them had become unemployed since October 2023, while 38 of 41 interviewed farmers responded “Yes” to the following question: “Have you or your colleagues felt unsafe accessing land for planting, caring for or harvesting crops or grazing livestock at any time since October 2023?” Five of them had become unemployed since October 2023.

74 Thirty-one of 41 interviewed farmers responded “No” to the following question: “Have you been able to plant and harvest your crops as normal since October 2023?” Five of them had become unemployed since October 2023.

75 Thirty-seven of 41 interviewed farmers responded “Yes” to the following question: “Has the overall amount of food you have produced reduced since October 2023?” Five of them had become unemployed since October 2023.

76 KIA 55, 9 April 2025; KIA 49, 9 April 2025.

77 IPC, “Lebanon acute food insecurity analysis, October 2024-March 2025”, January 2025, https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Lebanon_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Oct2024_Mar2025_Report.pdf

78 Thirty of 41 interviewed farmers responded “More” to the following question: “Have agricultural inputs (e.g. seeds, oil needed for equipment) become more or less difficult to obtain since October 2023?” Five had become unemployed since October 2023.

79 KIA 79, 10 April 2025.

80 IPC, May 2025.

81 KIA 78, 10 April 2025; KIA 92, 11 April 2025.

82 KIA 33, 8 April 2025.

83 KIA 36, 8 April 2025; KIA 59, 9 April 2025.

84 KIA 50, 8 April 2025.

85 KIA 34, 8 April 2025.

86 KIA 76, 10 April 2025.

87 KIA 43, 8 April 2025.

88 KIA 61, 9 April 2025.

89 KIA 35, 8 April 2025.

90 KIA 85, 10 April 2025; KIA 76, 10 April 2025.

91 KIA 88, 11 April 2025; KIA 92, 11 April 2025.

92 Eighteen of 41 interviewed farmers stated that they had received humanitarian aid since October 2023.

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94 Ibid.

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96 HRW, “Lebanon: destruction of infrastructure preventing returns”, 17 February 2025, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/02/17/lebanon-destruction-infrastructure-preventing-returns>.

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98 Al Jazeera, “‘A deep love’: the Nabatieh Monday market rises after Israeli destruction”, May 2025, <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2025/5/10/after-israel-bombs-nabatieh-monday-market-revives-itself-once-again>.

99 National News, “Lebanon’s Nabatieh begins slow rebuild despite obstacles after Israeli destruction of historical sites”, August 2025, <https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2025/08/15/israel-nabatieh-lebanon-el-fadl-villa/>.

100 Eighteen of 27 interviewees responded “Yes” to the following question: “Have there been times when you have felt unsafe using roads or transport routes to markets or food shops since October 2023?”

101 Twenty-two of 26 interviewees responded “No” to the following question: “Have food shops remained open as normal since October 2023?”

102 KIA 45, 9 April 2025.

103 Twenty-five of 28 interviewees responded “Yes” to the following question: “Has the conflict since October 2023 affected your household’s ability to meet its food needs?”

104 KIA 71, 9 April 2025.

105 IPC, January 2025.

106 KIA 85, 10 April 2025.

107 World Bank Group, 2024.

108 Trading Economics, 2025.

109 KIA 85, 10 April 2025.

110 Fourteen of 26 interviewees responded “Yes” to the following question: “Has humanitarian aid become more important for ensuring that you are able to eat sufficient food since October 2023?”

111 ACLED, <https://acleddata.com/>, accessed 25 June 2025.

112 See ICRC, International Humanitarian Law Databases, Customary IHL (CIHL), rule 8, <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl>.

113 ICC Statute, arts. 8(2)(b)(i), 8(2)(b)(ii) and 8(2)(e)(i), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/rome-statute-international-criminal-court>. Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects during a non-international armed conflicts (NIAC) is not listed as a war crime in the ICC Statute.

114 See ICRC, CIHL, rule 10.

115 Ibid., rule 54.

116 Ibid., explanation of rule 54.

117 Ibid.

118 Ibid., rule 14.

119 ICC Statute, art. 8(2)(b)(iv). This is specifically in the context of international armed conflicts. Additionally, “launching an indiscriminate attack resulting in death or injury to civilians, or an attack in the knowledge that it will cause excessive incidental civilian loss, injury or damage” is also listed as a war crime in NIACs, on the basis of state practice (ICRC, Commentary to CIHL, rule 156).

120 See ICRC, “International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts – recommitting to protection in armed conflict on the 70th anniversary of the Geneva Conventions”, <https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/4427-international-humanitarian-law-and-challenges-contemporary-armed-conflicts>.

121 See ICRC, CIHL, rule 15.

122 Ibid., rule 21.

123 Ibid., rule 17.

124 Ibid., rule 22.

125 Ibid., rule 23.

126 Ibid., explanation of rule 22.

This document is published by Insecurity Insight. It was produced with the support of the French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, builds on the agencies' earlier joint report "When Bombs Turn the Taps Off: The Impact of Conflict on Water Infrastructure in Lebanon", which demonstrated the devastating long-term and reverberating impacts of repeated Israeli attacks damaging and destroying water infrastructure in southern Lebanon and Bekaa.

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Suggested citation: Insecurity Insight, Action Against Hunger, and Oxfam. 2025. "We Lost Everything": The Impact of Conflict on Farmers and Food Security in Lebanon, October 2023-April 2025 (October 2025). Switzerland: Insecurity Insight. <https://bit.ly/LBNFoodOct2025>